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Two Facets of Crisis  
When it comes to higher education sector in Ukraine the key descriptor of the status quo is 
unequivocally crisis. This crisis is apparent in a number of different ways. Firstly, the higher 
education reform process itself is said to be in crisis through the accounts of local and 
international observers (e.g. Janmaat, 2008; Fimyar, 2008). There is an ostensible flight of 
students eager to pursue educational and career opportunities abroad. This has grave 
implications for Ukraine’s human capital and future prosperity (Semiv and Hvozdovych,  
2012). Those who stay often cheat or bribe their way through the system (e.g. 
DenisovaSchmidt, Prytula, Rumyantseva, 2018). The overgrown university system with over 
300 HEIs for 47 million of population is unnecessarily large both in terms of the student base 
which they are meant to serve as well as qualified academic staff which they are meant to 
employ (Rumyantseva and Logvynenko, 2017). Academic staff also vote with their feet by 
leaving higher education to join industry, civil service or civil society organisations, thus 
depleting higher education of qualified cadre.  The question naturally arises: who are these 
institutions serving and what sustains their existence? Yet each one of those intuitions just 
like any other organisation anywhere in the world, is naturally pre-occupied with 
organisational survival, which perhaps in part explains why Ministerial attempts to close 
some higher education institutions (HEIs) down were met with fierce resistance 
(Rumyantseva and Logvynenko, 2017) and it was Serhiy Kvit, the Minister of Education at 
the time who stepped down instead in 2016. National employers are disappointed with 
graduates’ employability skills (World Economic Forum, 2011), although it is difficult to 
gain agreement from the university leaders, who take a more positive view of higher 
education quality according to a recent survey (Democratic Initiatives Foundation, 2015).   
The second dimension of crisis is evidence in the thinking of academics and professionals 
studying higher education reform in Ukraine. On the one hand, Western academics (e.g.  
Janmaat, 2008), donors and consultants (OSI & NEPC, 2006; World Bank, 2004, 2005;  
Darvas, 2003; UNDP 2018) are quick to offer critical observations of the reform processes.  
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Most analytical accounts of crisis result in identifying some form of tension between Soviet 
legacies and Western/European values as the underlying reasons for crisis. Shaw, Chapman, 
Rumyantseva (2013) engage competing cultural values to explain why Bologna related 
changes are only partly implemented at the intuitional level. Oleksiyenko (2016) draws on the 
framework of the incompatible ideological perspectives. Shaw (2013) offers detailed analysis 
of the incompatible governance frameworks in an effort to understand what is at the bottom 
of the crisis. She concludes that the culprit is to be found in the conflict of the underlying 
assumptions about power, locus of control and acceptable sources of leadership. The conflict 
once again is located between the ever incompatible authoritarian (Soviet) and neo-liberal 
(Western) mind-sets. If only the nation could resolve these differences by agreeing on how 
they wish to mobilise power and from which sources, the crisis will be resolved. A 
monumental task of collective reflection on sources and purposes of leadership, which if 
accomplished would bring the current impasse to an end and allow the system progress and 
develop. This is a difficult challenge in the context where abuse of power and favouritism 
have been described as rampant (Osipian, 2017, 2014, 2010).  
For the time being, however, the clash between the two mind-sets remains in the state of an 
impasse and the system itself is said to be in a trap (Riabchuk, 2007). The second underlying 
theme in these studies is what Fimyar (2010:63-64) calls ‘an attack against the  
postcommunist state’s inability to cope with the crisis’. Political leadership of the country is 
criticized in the studies for the lack of commitment, expertise, vision, and strategy, as well as 
for the slow pace of reform and selective implementation of existing policies. Many 
commentators describe the Ukrainian education system as structurally ‘‘too centralized,’’ and 
in terms of institutional practices, ‘‘too Soviet.’’ An assumption is made and so far remains 
unchallenged in the literature that 20+ years of independence is a sufficiently long time for 
the society in general and higher education system in particular to undergo deep, large scale, 
social, economic  and political transformation.   
Fimyar (2010) has attempted to offer an alternative approach with an intention ‘to disrupt… 
the opposition between Soviet legacies and Western/European values’. Discourse analysis of 
higher education policy documents written by Ukrainians for Ukrainians initially offers a 
possibility of an alternative angle, something uncontaminated by the Western neoliberal 
influence.  Much to the readers’ (and possibly researcher’s?)  disappointment, the elaborate 
and time consuming analysis does not reveal any locally cultivated insights that may have 
been overlooked by the Western observers. Instead it concludes that Ukrainian government 
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has embraced the notion crisis in the early policy documents, at the same time laying down 
foundation for vigorous and potentially destructive self-critique. These documents tie higher 
education system’s development to ‘catch-up Europeanisation’. Insufficient recognition is 
made of the long standing positive aspects of the system. Instead, the crisis has been given 
legitimacy by system level leaders and politicians in the onset of Ukrainian independence. 
Western observers critique Ukrainian government who are only happy to be the first to 
critique themselves. But does such critical thinking have the ability to lead to critical action 
that would enable positive transformations?  Or is this the case of the crisis of critical 
thinking in higher education leadership? Or the crisis of thinking about the system more 
widely?   
It is on the backdrop of the critical thinking standstill, that this chapter engages the concepts 
of historical memory (Fedinec and Csermocsko, 2017) and the collective trauma (Sotero, 
2006; Bowen and Shaanta Murshid, 2016; Somasundaram, 2007) in an effort to look at the 
higher education reform from a historical and trauma-informed informed perspective (Bowen 
and Murshid, 2016). We argue that what is happening in the sector now can be better 
understood and appreciated in the wider historical context of lives of the Ukrainian people 
and the archetypal notions of leadership that have formed over the centuries in the collective 
Ukrainian memory.  We draw on elements of Ukraine’s difficult and traumatic history to 
point to the potentially unhealed wounds in the collective memory that may be affecting 
society and higher education reform processes in the present day. It is because of such 
wounds and ‘hot memory’ (Fedinec and Csermocsko, 2017) that critical thinking unless 
informed by trauma informed understanding, is likely to become unbalanced and 
unproductive. Engaging the trauma informed understanding (Bowen and Murshid, 2016) can 
offer tools for more careful and specific approaches to the analysis of  HE reforms both by 
the Ukrainian decision makers and those external observers, scholars, consultants who 
presumably study Ukrainian HE reform with constructive intentions.  We juxtapose that 
current degrees of trauma awareness in Ukrainian and Western leaders and analysts is 
currently insufficient. And yet it is possible that collective trauma legacy continues to 
influence Ukrainian leaders, follower and the decision making processes in the present. 
Whilst, Ukraine’s historical victim position is central to this analysis, we take care to avoid 
casting Ukraine in the light of helpless victimhood alone. We aim to disentangle the sources 
of historical victimisation from the present day realities by looking at the position of Ukraine 
via-a-vi surrounding empirical power and the role of the West. This approach offers a 
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different pathway for enabling trauma informed critical thinking that has higher capacity to 
lead to critical being (Barnett, 1997) and positive change in all national and sub-national 
contexts that experienced events of collective traumatic.   
Historical Leadership Roles and the Events of Collective Trauma   
Kovryga and Nickel (2004: 610) perceptively suggest that Ukrainian society has a strong 
shadow side, a parallel reality that exists behind the ideological façade which serves the 
purpose of satisfying the international pressures for reform. The shadow side ‘represents a 
more authentic progression towards change and the struggles, which underlie survival’. This 
locally informed perspective is valuable in understanding the insider realities which often 
remain hidden to the external observer’s eye. However, we invite the reader to consider an 
extension of this one sided statement and allow a possibility of simultaneous co-existence of 
the authentic shadow and the authentic visible side. After all, Ukrainian government has 
voluntarily signed up to the Bologna process in 2005 and many of the modernisation goals 
that form key elements of the reform had been set out in the Ukrainian policy documents long 
before that (Fimyar, 2010).  Analytically allowing for the presence of these conflicting 
motivations opens up a different path for analysis of the role of leadership in HE and 
approaches to leadership development in higher education. Understanding the possible 
sources of the rift between the shadow and the visible side, we argue, holds not only the 
explanatory power but also serves as bridge towards a different kind of critical thinking about 
the crisis.   But just how did this rift came about? Fimyar (2014) in her analysis of western 
policies in non-western contexts, connects it to the violent exercise  of power that was 
historically present in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Ukrainian 
history in particularly is full of disadvantageous for Ukraine power dynamics and struggle for 
identity and statehood (Subtelny, 2009).  The historical events of 1933 Holodomor are but 
one (admittedly largest in scale) example of where the exercise of power had been transmuted 
into the exercise of violence towards the Ukrainian people.   
Although Ukrainian people existed since the collapse of the Kyivan Rus in the 12th century, 
Ukrainian state, along with many other former Soviet republic, has only come to exist in a 
non-fleeting form in 1991, making Ukraine one of the youngest countries on the planet. 
However, unlike, for instance Baltic countries, whose independence enabled them to return to 
their once strong autonomy, Ukraine has emerged as an ‘unexpected nation’ (Wilson, 2015) 
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with virtually no history or experience of self-governance.  And yet, unlike Belarus, who did 
not have any HEIs on its present day territory, until the first one was established by the Soviet 
government, Ukrainian higher education (yes in the absence of the Ukrainian state) played a 
leading role in the struggles for independence. The first medieval universities were 
established in the modern day Western Ukraine by members of Ukrainian clergy. Their 
founders used them as vehicles for promoting Ukrainian identity (in this instance through  
Christian Orthodox religion) in the face of external threats of Catholicism and the Rule of the 
Polish King (Yershova and Gordiichuk, 2013: 474).  Universities that opened in the East of 
the modern day Ukraine were the initiative of the Russian Tsar. They followed a more 
centralised model of governance and hence conformed more to the expectations of their 
sponsors (Osipian, 2008).   
Whilst the absence of independent nation state has limited Ukrainians’ capacity to develop and 
improve the skills of self-governance, it simultaneously created favourable conditions for 
development of the shadow side of leadership, namely the skills of leading via the means of 
resistance and defiance against the dominant powers, with universities and university leaders 
often playing a key role in the process. These efforts were driven by the desire for survival, as 
a distinct ethnic group with its own language and culture.  Some of the key leaders of the 
Ukrainian struggle for independence, for instance, Ivan Mazepa (1687-1708) and Stepan 
Bandera (1909-1959), are best known for their achievements in these domains, which also 
explains why different observes, depending on where their loyalties lay may choose to view 
them as historical heroes on the one hand or as traitors (as was the case with Mazepa) or 
terrorists (as was the case with Bandera), on the other.   
Understanding these historical patterns of relationship to authority and direction and purpose 
of decision making efforts, provides the context for what Kovryga and Nickel (2004: 624) call 
‘well mastered processes of de-centralisation in [modern] Ukraine’. Fimyar (2014) uses the 
term ‘‘partisan’ responses to policies in illiberal contexts’ to describe the same phenomenon. 
According to these interpretations, Ukrainians continue to engage in day to day decentralisation 
of centrally issued directives. Such decentralisation, occurs through local action in private that 
goes against the grain of publicly stated goals. It happens at the policy level, level of individual 
HEIs as well as individual academics and students. Whether the center was Imperial Russia, 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, Imperial Poland or the Soviet Union is of lesser importance. What 
matters for the purposes of our analysis is that such context creates a fruitful ground for 
developing approach to leadership and followership, characterised by resistance, subversion 
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and opposition. If the centre was viewed as an unwelcome imposition, from the perspective of 
the oppressed, subversion became a healthy response to unhealthy circumstances, a defence 
necessary for survival.   
Predictably, the struggles for identity by Ukrainians were met with opposition from the 
surrounding imperial powers who had opposing goals. The struggle was often overlooked or 
ignored by the Western European leaders who were more concerned with carefully balancing 
their own relationships with Russia and Poland (Reid, 1997). On more than one historical 
occasion Western Europeans chose to collude with greater powers at the expense of 
Ukrainians’ right to self-identification and independence (Reid, 1997, Subtelny, 2009). This 
is an important point that many present day Western analysts of higher education reform tend 
to overlook when critically analysing Ukrainian policies and yet these facts may influence the 
ethics of attributing responsibility. Naturally, such profound conflict of interest between 
Ukraine and the Imperial powers as well as Ukraine and Western Europe has led to 
relationships, which for Ukrainians at least were ridden with mistrust.   Despite this, however, 
Ukrainian higher education continued to produce high quality intellectuals who continuously 
cultivated home grown capacity for self-identification and nation building. These individuals 
were often risking their lives for engaging in what Davies (2015) calls critical action. Stalin’s 
rule over the Soviet Union has been particularly full of aggression towards Ukraine’ 
intellectuals, which resulted in targeted elimination of intellectual elites in 1920s-30s (e.g.  
Serhiy Efremov, Les Kurbas), 1940s-50s (e.g. Mykola Holodnyi, Oleksandr Bogomolets). 
Besides, institutions that were in place such as ‘Ukrainian Academy of Science, which were 
originally established to foster Ukrainian nation-building, were converted into institutions 
aimed at promoting Soviet ideology’ in 1920-30s (Hladchenko, Dobbins, Jungblut, 2018).   
The 1930s have turned out to be particularly dark and damaging for Ukraine (Applebaum, 
2018). After elimination of intellectual elites who performed a function of the national 
leaders for Ukrainian self-determination, Stalin has initiated the policy of the so called 
prodrazvyorstka, which lead to the historical events of Holodomor of 1933 (Applebaum,  
2017). ‘Stalin directed confiscation of harvests and foods’ (Bezo and Maggie, 2015) in  
Ukrainian countryside was carefully planned and well executed (Klid and Motyl, 2012). 
Travel restrictions and road blocks were put in place to restrict movement as much as 
possible. Eventually, people deprived of food and means to seek it elsewhere, slowly and 
painfully died of hunger. The exact casualties are uncertain as Stalin ordered the execution of 
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the lead census takers (Subtelny, 2009; Applebaum, 2018) but the estimates of this genocide 
range from 3 to 6 million (Subtelny, 2009). Those who survived suffered profound 
humiliation, witnessed their childrens’, parents’, neighbours’ deaths. In many places funerals 
were prohibited, bodies remained on the streams as means of further terrorisation.  
Cannibalism flourished.   
Historical trauma is a relatively new concept in the academic literature and its connection to 
the large scale change process is largely under-explored. Historical trauma occurs where a 
dominant group subjects a certain population to all or one of the following: long-term 
segregation, displacement, physical and/or psychological violence, economic destruction and 
cultural dispossession (Sotero, 2006; Bowen and Shaanta Murshid, 2016; Somasundaram, 
2007). Embedded in the definition is a deliberately violent use of power and hence 
destructive exercise of leadership with devastating consequences for affected populations. 
Trauma effect goes beyond the affected population. Cumulative research evidence suggests 
that trauma survivors pass the trauma onto subsequent generations. Levine (2015:163) notes 
that in the context of trauma treatment ‘individuals frequently described surprisingly specific 
and often horrific images, sensations and emotions about events that seemed quite real but 
could not possibly have happened to them’.  Research into survivors and their off springs 
identifies an array of negative consequences at individual, familial and collective levels, 
ranging from depressive moods (Major, 1996), fear and mistrust they struggle to explain 
(Rowland-Klein and Dunlop, 1997), pervasive sense of shame (Karenian et al., 2010), 
increased suicidal thoughts in some cases (Elias et al., 2012), and as some propose, societal 
loss of culture and way of life (Evans-Campbell, 2008).    
In the specific case of Ukraine, Holodomor both followed and preceded other longer lasting 
and ongoing events of repression of Ukrainian uprisings and resistant movements, and 
deprivations of basic necessities. Denial is a significant component of the psychological 
response to trauma (Chang, 2017). Both victims, perpetrators and those who witness 
atrocities (particularly when they choose not to interfere) are motivated albeit for different 
reasons to deny the events took place (Applebaum, 2017).  In line with the usual response to 
trauma, Holodomor remained a taboo subject in both Ukraine and the West, gaining only 
marginal amount of attention in Ukraine since independence and some recent attention from 
the Western researchers (Applebaum, 2018) and US Senate (Najarian, 2018). Unsurprisingly, 
the effects of Holodomor remain largely understudied. The role of Western Europe in relation 
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to these events is equally understudied. Reid (1997), an  English journalist a historian 
comments that many Western journalists working in Ukraine at the time had chosen not to 
report the atrocities back to their headquarters in Europe and the US out of desire to hold on 
to their privileged access to then very closed Soviet Union. Applebaum (2017) describes how 
the Soviet apparatus kept Western journalists in check and one particular New Year Times 
correspondent had gone as far as to justify the infliction of suffering, repeating the language 
of the Stalin’s inner circles. Clearly, such lack of critical action would have contributed to the 
process of denial which the Soviet government was motivated to maintain. It may also have 
contributed to the historically accumulated mistrust between Ukraine and the West of which 
perhaps present day analysts and consultants in higher education remain unaware.   
Trauma does not only occur in a given point in time. It has a way of finding its way into the 
future through the process of trans-generational transmission (Evans-Campbell, 2008). As  
Ukrainian historian Grycak (2015:32-33) asserts ‘It is nearly impossible to find a family in 
Ukraine who in the 20th century would not have suffered from violence, managed to stay in 
one place or keep their property. This fact gives us a key to understanding Ukrainians’ 
behaviour. According to surveys, what they most want is safety and stability in order to break 
away from this insane history.’  Although empirical research into trans-generational trauma 
transmission in Ukraine is very limited, Bezo and Maggie’ study (2015) is a valuable 
exception. These Canadian researches have studied resulting emotional states and the coping 
mechanisms by engaging three generations of the survivors of the actual events of 1933. 
They were specifically interested in investigating ‘whether potential trauma, stemming from 
the Holodomor, continues to exert an intergenerational impact’ (p. 88) in the present day. 
Some of their findings bear connection to Ukrainians’ thoughts and feelings about leadership, 
and the manner in which they are likely to engage with authority and power in the present. 
Given the mass scale of artificially engineered hunger in Ukraine and the intern-generational 
effects of trauma, we propose that Bezo and Maggie’s (2015) findings may hold explanatory 
potential for the leadership dynamics in the modern day higher education system. And just as 
Holodomor itself straddled Russia, Ukraine and the West through the perpetrator-
victim(non)rescuer triangle, the legacy of it may hold the explanatory power for the crisis of 
critical thinking around higher education reform in Ukraine that we are witnessing today.   
Bezo and Maggie (2015) report two sets of findings from the interviews with three 
generations of Holodomor survivors: traumatic emotional states associated with Holodomor 
9  
  
and trauma-based coping strategies. Specifically, three types of fear were reported: fear of 
repeated abuse of power; fear to take action and ‘fear and mistrust in others’. Fear of another 
genocide, a repeated abuse of power is a natural extension of the Holodomor events. Fear to 
take action stems from memories of server punishments that survivors witness in others who 
attempted to take action to secure food and were killed by armed soldiers. This emotional 
state continue to live in all three generations of respondents taking on a form of ‘a fear to 
oppose, challenge, openly question, speak out against or strive to change the status quo, 
authority, government, public policy, or legislation’ (p. 90). Third generation of respondents 
described how they came to internalise such fears through ‘family oral histories of 
Holodomor-related atrocities’. The knowledge that Ukrainians were targeted and mistreated 
and hence isolated from others also connected to fear and mistrust of others. Other emotional 
states reported by the participants included sadness over the loss of family members and 
deaths of others, ethnic related shame ‘as a result of the Holodomor being inflicted on 
Ukrainians’. Interestingly, anger was the least discussed emotions but was also present in the 
interviews. These difficult emotional states necessitated certain coping strategies that resulted 
in patterns of surviving behaviours some of which may bear relevance to the inter-personal 
relationships today. Namely, the perceived need for self-preservation and ‘survival’ were 
reported to create ‘an increased social hostility’. ‘Hence, an indifference toward others 
emerged, that was reported not as an intrinsic selfishness, but rather the result of the 
perceived need for self-preservation that emerged during the Holodomor’ (p. 91).   
  
Towards Trauma Informed Understanding of Higher Education Reform  
  
Literature on Ukrainian higher education reform reveals overlapping themes with those 
uncovered in the research on the collective trauma and broader Ukrainian history. Just like 
traumatic experiences become locked in the collective consciousness, the higher education 
system may be trapped in the historical patterns of authority, power, and violence which are 
being propagated through the system in the unending and unchecked cycle of the 
transgenerational transmission of trauma. We aim to develop understanding of how some of 
the trauma patterns may be playing out in the higher education system at various levels and 
seek insights as to how such cycles of trauma may be interrupted by engaging critical 






Centralisation/Decentralisation Tension in the Bologna expectations: un-reflected, 
undiscussed and unresolved  
  
Although Ukrainian policy makers have voluntarily signed up to the Bologna process, 
Ukrainian observers note the commitment to engage has dwindled over time (Shevchenko, 
2018). Kovacs’s analysis (2014) notes a dual motivation of the Ukrainian higher education 
policy makers: to preserve good relations with EU and to preserve much desired independence 
at the same time.  As recent political events have demonstrated, both of these goals are equally 
desired by the Ukrainian people (possibly with the exception of some parts of the Eastern 
territories) and the Ukrainian government. Ukrainian higher education policy makers reconcile 
these opposing tendencies through non-confrontational decentralisation expressed in quiet 
decline in frequency of reports and inclusion of only limited information in the reports 
(Shevchenko, 2018; Educational Policy Portal, 2015). Such strategy precludes the Western 
counterparts from understanding the reality of what is happening, keeping the tensions around 
national building in the shadow. At the same time it maintains control with the Ukrainian side 
whilst avoiding possible open confrontation with the West. The tensions between national 
interests and the requirements of the Bologna process are not unique to Ukraine, although other 
nations have been more open in vocalising their concerns and more assertive at reconciling 
tensions (Ravinet, 2008).  As a younger and more recent newcomer to the Bologna process, 
Ukraine’s position is more vulnerable than that of Germany, UK or France.  This position visa-
vi the West is historically familiar to Ukraine and carries similar power structures as in the past. 
The other side of this two way process is the uncertainty of the European response, should 
Ukraine choose to be more vocal about its national priorities. Western observers’ ease at 
historically insensitive critiquing of Ukraine for poor performance in higher education reform 
may be experienced as emotionally charged with shame, further blocking the possibility of 
dialogue. Ukrainian policy makers reconcile this dilemma by explicitly dis-owning agency in 
the official policy documents through an impersonal use of language (Fimyar, 2010), thus 








Fear of Authority and Fear to Take Action   
  
The ambivalence of the overall policy environment and high levels of mistrust at the policy 
level are transmitted to the national level university leaders. In the context of over-populated 
higher education system and strong dependencies of HEIs on ‘the political environment for 
regulations, funding, and legitimacy’ (Hladchenko, Dobbins and Jungblutd, 2018: 9), 
individual institutions are placed in a position where their survival depends on rector’s 
capacity to build relationships with civil servants and politicians. Present day ambivalence 
combined with the historical fear of authority creates a fertile ground for the abuse of power. 
Civil servants and politicians themselves exist in an ambivalent legal framework without 
clear sense of boundaries and accountability (e.g. see Kovryga and Nickel (2004) for some 
insightful analysis). Who wins? Who losses? What are the definitions of success and failure? 
The possibility of resisting or challenging the governmental policies is not widely considered 
by the institutional leaders.  Critical reflection and thinking if engaged does not translate into 
critical action. Instead, leaders are co-coped into the political processes and HEIs are being 
engages to serve the political ends. Such realities both shape the existing leaders’ behaviours 
and attract individuals to these roles who are content with low levels of agency available to 
them, in other words non-leaders.   
These dynamics resonate closely with that Cooper’s (2017) describes as dysfunctional social 
processes in societies with the historical experience of collective trauma.  Similar to trauma 
victims, university rectors along with the organisations for which they are responsible, find 
that they are being caught in a double bind (Weaver 2008; Shaw, Chapman, Rumyantseva, 
2013). Their stated goals are to develop and improve  their HEIs, however in order to hold on 
to their roles and possibly to protect their institutions from closures or mergers, they strike 
deals with civil servants and politicians which often divert institutional goals towards 
political ends. Observers comment that such dynamics continue at the cost of causing harm to 
educational institutions and undermining of their social functions (Hladchenko, Dobbins and 
Jungblutd’s, 2018). Little space is left for changes advocated for by the scholars of the reform 
process or any change that university rectors themselves may see as necessary. Once again, as 
in previous historical circumstances, survival needs dictate action. Whether the underlying 
basis of this collusion stem from lack of awareness, fear to take action, objective necessity to 
survival or a combination of these factors is a subject for an empirical exploration.    
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However, continuous compliance with conflicted expectations of the Ministry and active 
denial of well recognised challenges facing HEIs by this potentially powerful institutional 
leaders continuously contribute to the transformational trap that generates a state of crisis in 
the system. Non-compliance may lead to distraction.   
Similar forces at work at the organisational level have been reported by Shaw, Chapman, 
Rumyantseva (2013) who note that individual academics receive conflicting messages about 
what is expected of them, which in turns reproduces the double bind at the individual level 
(Bateson, 1972). Shaw, Chapman and Rumyantseva (2011:8) provide empirical evidence of 
academic staff’s fear of authority, particularly exemplified in an interview quote ‘It is not 
such a good thing here to stand out’, whilst recognising that ‘the dearth of critical voices 
towards university leadership was likely related to a fear of authority that has been shown to 
be rather common in post-socialist societies’. Additionally, the lack of critical voices in 
confidential interviews with Western based researchers may signify the lack of awareness or 
a state of denial of one’s own fearful mood in relation to their leaders. Fear and particularly 
the denial of fear, once permanently instituted in the collective consciousness becomes a 
selffulfilling prophecy that runs the system on auto-pilot (Argyris, 2010). Whilst significant 
responsibility is disowned at the policy level, it often becomes shifted into academic staff 
(Rumyantseva and Logvynenko, 2017). Although academics staff have been described as 
highly capable critical thinkers, their sphere of action is severely constrained by regulations, 
budgets and fear of authority. Ultimately, the responsibility for enacting change becomes 
shifted onto actors who are not in a position to implement it to the desired extent, which 
further perpetuating their sense of helplessness typical of victims of the collective trauma.   
  
Self-preservation and Indifference Towards Others   
  
Higher education system as well as the broader political system in Ukraine are frequently 
described as corrupt (Osipian, 2008, 2017). Positions of power are occupied by individuals 
who often misuse their office for private gain subverting the publicly stated intentions. The 
general recognition of these dynamics by Ukrainians themselves has been captured in a 
satirical TV series ‘Servant of the People’ and then skilfully presented in the ‘The Economist’ 
(2018) as a part of the broader discussion of corruption and abuse of power in Ukraine. Much 
has been written about this particular aspect of Ukrainian politics (e.g. Yurchenko, 2018). 
Osipian demonstrates how numerous governments have exercised strong leverage over 
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universities through abuse of power, how inconsistent and ambivalent expectations leave 
opportunities open for abusive practices within the HE system, resulting in corruption in 
licensing, accreditation, admissions and testing (Osipian, 2008, 2017). Hladchenko, Dobbins 
and Jungblutd’s, (2018) demonstrate how ‘favouritism has also shaped the institutional 
architecture of Ukrainian HE and research to the benefit of powerful actors’. They argue that 
‘the politics of ‘‘status enhancement’’ and favouritism has resulted in a situation in which 
organizational forms are largely decoupled from their endowed tasks and thus impede 
fundamental reform and the alignment with western HE models’. In other words, it is no 
accident that the higher education system has been hijacked to serve the interests of the few at 
the expense of the wellbeing of the majority.   
We propose that these types of behaviours of formal leaders can be described as a collective 
dysfunction. Similarly to alcoholism or drug addiction, such ‘dysfunctional behaviours 
sometimes come to symbolize a traumatic group experience’ (Cooper, 2017). The 
propagation of such dynamics through the layers of the system contributes yet another layer 
to the transformational trap.   
  
  
And what of Critical Critical Thinking? 
  
Up until 1990s, Ukraine was a neglected nation (Reid, 1997). And yet the contemporary crisis 
in higher education and elsewhere in the public sector has drawn a lot of attention from the 
outside world. Is it possible that the crisis in higher education reforms and in thinking about 
the reform process is a wakeup call to both Ukrainians and the outside world?  Perhaps, the 
complex dynamics in the higher education sector are a starting point for a re-introduction of 
Ukraine to the West, re-introduction of the nation that has undergone centuries of oppression 
and the more recent experiences of the collective trauma and yet managed to survive despite 
it and surprise the world with its very emergence out of the Soviet blur in 1991 (Wilson, 
2015). Whilst Ukrainians’ fear of challenging authority and possible denial of such fears is 
likely to play a role in sustaining the dysfunctional processes and reinforcing the 
transformational trap in higher education (Argyris, 2010), it also offers an opportunity to 
reconsider the role of critical thinking in sustaining but also resolving some of these 
dysfunctional dynamics. As Argyris (2010) points out, traps are not uncommon in even the 
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most successful organisations in the most stable of contexts. Can the world learn from 
Ukrainian experience and those of other national contexts that experienced the collective 
trauma?   
Cooper (2017: x) proposes an explanations grounded in the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979 cited in Copper, 2017) of how dysfunctional group dynamics may be maintained 
by both the in group and out group.  Victimised populations may be more likely to experience 
collective dysfunction when ‘(a) a dysfunctional group behaviour is perceived to symbolize 
their collective trauma, and (b) the group’s collective trauma(s) is denied by powerful 
outgroups’. How much awareness do Ukrainian leaders at various levels have about their 
intergenerational trauma experience and how it influences their decision in the present? 
Without understanding of the legacy they have inherited and cultivating self and other-
compassion, they are would be unable to gain clarity around their shadow motivations and/or 
to resolve an internal conflict of wanting to move forward with the changes or to stay within 
the arguable safety of the status quo. How much awareness do Western leaders and leader 
developers have of the effects of the traumatic past and its influence on the present? Do they 
understand the implications of working with a society whose experience has been of 
subjugation and which often fell in between the cracks of political power play and interests of 
more powerful nations, including those who today comprise the European Union? Do they 
possess emotional awareness and sensitivity to engage with such traumatised populations with 
judgement? Insufficient understanding by the Western analysts and donors may be contributing 
an additional layer to the transformational trap. By not explicitly acknowledging the trauma 
and its consequences, the exercise of critical thinking (and in particular in the form of critical 
judgement (Davies, 2015) towards higher education by the outsiders, may take on a destructive 
turn and be perceived by Ukrainians as an attempt at shaming, thus once again triggering the 
feelings of ethnocentric shame inherited from the Genocide (Bezo and Maggie, 2015).   
Moreover, addressing traumatic experiences in Ukraine and elsewhere needs to become an 
integral part of any developmental efforts whether they are driven internally or from the 
outside.  In addition to critical observations of dysfunctional behaviours, there has to be an 
acknowledgement of complex emotional structures that are likely to underpin them. Goltz 
(2018:426) advocates for an approach to change where emotions and discomforts are 
recognised and owned. Drawing on the aspects of Buddhism and approaches from 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, she argues for an approach that places ‘an emphasis 
on contact with reality even when it is uncomfortable, doing so with acceptance and 
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nonjudgment, and moving toward valued actions in the presence of discomfort.’ Suspending 
critical judgement so characteristic of academic and policy documents may be a key to 
allowing for the emergence of trauma informed understanding. Such newly found 
understanding tapping into the psychological resilience that co-exists with vulnerability in 
traumatised populations (Chan, 2007)  is likely to change ways in which critical arguments 
are formulated and critical dispositions and attitudes are developed. It opens pathways for 
cultivating compassion and kindness without giving up the rigor of critical thinking. Even in 
the presence of fear of authority and ethnocentric shame, such approaches may lead to 
healing of the historical wounds and subsequent critical action capable of overcoming various 
elements of the trap. As atrocious as it was, Holodomor has also become a commemoration 
of the resilience of the Ukraine people and Ukraine’ independence is celebration of survival. 
Gradual de-layering of traumatic defences would unlock the national potential for creativity 
and continuous cultivation of the nation’s potential for self-governance. Critical creativity in 
the presence of an open trauma-sensitive dialogue would open up alternative pathways for 
accommodating competing values and reconciliation of the past losses in the view of moving 
onto an alternative, previously un-envisioned futures where higher education system and the 
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